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ABSTRACT 
“Achieving awareness in the maritime domain, including intelligence and 
information sharing at all levels of government is a key to our maritime security. Better 
awareness of what is out there leads to better unity of effort in maritime planning and 
operations. We need to have a common operating picture. We also need to integrate our 
operational capabilities and efforts with our private sector partners to better prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from incidents.” –Admiral Thad Allen, 2007. 
The application of Network Centric Warfare theory enables all port stakeholders 
to better prepare for a disaster through increased information sharing and collaboration.  
Currently, a significant gap in connectivity exists among the many entities responsible for 
securing the intermodal supply chain throughout the port complex. The research 
conducted in this thesis creates an architecture using the theory of Network Centric 
Warfare to perpetuate a cycle of preparedness in a seaport, thus enhancing situational 
awareness for improved security. As a result of the research conducted in this thesis, the 
architecture is being applied in the Port of Los Angeles/ Long Beach in the form of a 
public/private “virtual maritime fusion center” to fill the gap between stakeholders thus 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2004, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 13 outlined the need for a National Maritime Security 
Policy. The National Maritime Security Strategy was completed along with eight 
supporting plans.  These plans establish a comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA) plan including preventive guidelines for securing the waterways from a terrorist 
attack and the joint efforts to respond to one. Each maritime plan stresses the inclusion of 
the private sector and the coordinated efforts which must occur in order to properly and 
thoroughly secure our nation’s seaports. 
On May 25, 2006, The Department of Homeland Security released the latest 
version of the National Response Plan (NRP).  This plan establishes a comprehensive all-
hazards approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic 
incidents.  The NRP forms the basis of how the federal government coordinates with 
state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector during incidents1.   
The NRP and the National Maritime Strategy both underpin the need for 
coordinated efforts across all sectors of government and industry to secure our nation.  
Even though the emphasis of collaboration is clearly the direction of most homeland 
security plans, very few successful public/private collaborative programs have been 
implemented on a large scale to include the maritime domain. In recent years several 
comprehensive assessments have specifically examined the complexities of port security.  
The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC)2 and Stevens Institute of Technology3  
cite complicated jurisdictional venues that inherently stove-pipe security as a primary 
obstacle to secure our nation’s economic pulse point. 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPbaseplan.pdf [Accessed 
January 21, 2007. 
2 Public Policy Institute of California.2006. Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and 
Cost involving the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Complex (2006). 
3 Securing the Port of New York and New Jersey: Network-Centric Operations Applied to the 
Campaign Against Terrorism (Hoboken, NJ: Stevens Institute of Technology 2004). 
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For example, the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach is a complex jurisdictional 
network that interfaces with more than fifteen different law enforcement agencies,4 two 
separate cities with two mayors, five county supervisors, 10 harbor commissioners and 24 
city council members. Each operates under a number of federal, state and local guidelines 
that assign management resources for emergencies to different agencies depending on the 
circumstances.5  The attempt to integrate a multitude of private security companies 
tasked with protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure adds to the complexity. 
As the recognition of the significance of port security increases, so does the 
involvement of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.  The national push to 
establish collaborative efforts to secure the homeland is evident at all levels of 
government. The creation of a Critical Infrastructure/Port Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) in the LA/LB Port Complex emphasizes securing critical infrastructures as well as 
economic interests.  This JTTF is comprised of federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies working together with the specific goal of preventing and investigating acts of 
terrorism committed against critical infrastructure in the maritime supply chain6.  This 
team of investigators is stationed near the LA/LB port complex in the Long Beach 
Resident Area of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Collaboration among the various law enforcement agencies in the greater Los 
Angeles Area has improved significantly to include a Joint Regional Intelligence Center 
(JRIC). Their purpose includes forming a collaborative bond to improve our nation’s 
homeland security through the fusion of intelligence from multiple source reporting.   
One evident gap in the port collaborative fabric is the incorporation of private 
stakeholders as a partner in securing the homeland and critical infrastructure, particularly 
in the areas of prevention, response and recovery.  For example, in the port of LA/LB, 
there is no networked system currently in place wherein private security can (1) access 
                                                 
4 The following entities have overlapping jurisdiction or collateral functions in the Port Complex: 
Long Beach and Los Angeles Police Departments, Long Beach Harbor Department, LA Port Police, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FBI, Los Angeles County Sheriffs, Department of Homeland 
Security, CIA DEA and CHP. 
5 Public Policy Institute of California.2006. Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and 
Cost involving the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Complex. 
6 Collateral duties of this squad include rail, air and domestic terrorism investigations. 
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intelligence bulletins, (2) report suspicious activity, (3) receive training and (4) 
immediately access situational reports during a live incident.  Access to this information 
in a networked framework would give the private stakeholders, the true first responders a 
common operating picture in which to better secure the nation’s vital infrastructure. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can Network Centric Warfare theory be applied to public/private 
collaboration in an effort to increase overall maritime preparedness and security?  
Moreover, how would this theory support effective collection, dissemination of 
intelligence, sharing of information and situational awareness updates to portray a 
common operating picture in support of MDA?  
 
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research reviews current maritime strategies and 
recommendations and applies a theory that supports four pillars of National Preparedness 
as listed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8: prevention, protection, 
response and recovery.  This theory enables both public and private port stakeholders to 
better prepare for a disaster through increased information sharing and collaboration.  
Currently, a significant gap in connectivity exists among all the many entities responsible 
for homeland security in the port complex. The research conducted in this thesis creates 
an architecture using the theory of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)7 to perpetuate The 
Cycle of Preparedness8 in a port complex, thus enhancing situational awareness for 
improved security. The successful design and application as described herein could be a 
national and regional architecture linking federal, state, local and private industry with 
responsibility, authority or stake in matters of maritime security. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Military theory allowing a common operating picture through information dissemination. 
8 William V. Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management  2, no.1 (2005), 
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss1/5  [Accessed May 20, 2006]. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Ports represent vital components to our economic well-being and are of major 
interest to our national security.  In 2004, U.S. ports were responsible for $948 billion in 
waterborne trade and the future growth is predicted to only increase in the next 20 years.  
Moreover, ports provide major employment opportunities to more than 4 million people 
generating over $44 billion in annual income. 
America’s ports are also used as military platforms to protect our country as well 
as a logistical support base for Operation Enduring Freedom9  and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.10  The terrorist threat to the Maritime Domain is real and potentially 
devastating as evidenced by past maritime attacks around the world.  On October 12, 
2000, al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole in Yemen, resulting in 17 deaths and 39 injuries of 
U.S. sailors.11  On December 25, 1993, The Palestine National Liberation Movement 
bombed an Israeli ship while it was docked in the port of Eilat resulting in 11 injuries.12 
Any attack on the global maritime supply chain committed either in the United 
States or abroad would be devastating and the aftermath of destruction would be 
exacerbated if an attack were to occur in a major port such as LA/LB or NY/NJ.  It is 
incumbent upon all key players, both public and private, to make a concerted, 
collaborative effort to secure our critical infrastructure.  The research conducted within 
this thesis enhances MDA by providing a means to establish the private stakeholders as a 
full partner in the aspects of a disaster from prevention to recovery. 
 
E. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE  
1. Maritime Security Strategies 
a. National Strategy for Maritime Security  
According to the strategy, “MDA requires information ranging from the 
detailed mapping of the coastal ocean floor to strategies that identify the multitude of 
                                                 
9 Military operations in Afghanistan. 
10 Military operations in Iraq.  
11 MIPT http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=16298. [Last accessed January 12, 2007]. 
12 Ibid. 
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vessels that operate along the more than 95,000 miles of shoreline and in the 25,000 
miles of navigable waterways and 3.4 million square miles of open water that comprise 
the U.S. economic exclusion zone. MDA represents an important tool that can be 
employed to further protect the safety and security of the United States and the continued 
operation of the maritime transportation industry in U.S. waters.”13 
In an effort to recognize and reduce vulnerabilities of U.S. ports and 
waterways following the attacks of September 11th, the United States 
Coast Guard has spearheaded an interagency approach for establishing 
MDA. The core of MDA efforts revolve around the development and use 
of accurate information, intelligence, and knowledge of vessels, cargo, 
crews, and passengers, and extend this well beyond traditional maritime 
boundaries. MDA is designed to provide a layered defense through 
collaborative efforts with international partners to identify and counter 
security risks long before they reach a U.S. port.14 
NSPD 41/HSPD 13 defines “Maritime Domain” as all areas and things of, 
on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable 
waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and 
vessels and other conveyances.15 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security states, “Maritime security is 
best achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale 
into an integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats.”16 Although several efforts 
have been made to involve the private sector into homeland security, many of them are 
either voluntary or implemented by regulatory requirements.  The leap to integrating 





                                                 
13 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington D.C. September, 2005. 
14 Ibid.  
15 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 13, December 2004. 
16 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, ii. 
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According to the strategy, a four-layered approach to maritime security 
must address vulnerabilities such as transportation, staff, passengers, conveyances, access 
control, cargo and baggage and ports and security en route to the US.17  The four layers 
are described as:18 
Physical protection is a fundamental layer including protected zones, 
access controls and barriers, fences, guards and surveillance equipment along with 
standards and procedures establishing minimum requirements for securing critical 
infrastructures. 
Physical cargo inspections provide another layer of security wherein all 
inbound cargo is screened for WMD components.  It also includes the establishment of 
mandatory reporting requirements provided by the private sector.  All inbound cargo 
designated as high risk is preferably screened prior to loading.   
Interdiction of personnel and materials that could pose a threat for the 
maritime domain is another essential layer of security.  The interdiction applies to 
terrorist personnel, financing, WMD or other contraband as detected by coordinated 
intelligence and/or allocation of resources. It includes the monitoring of high interest 
vessel traffic and the movement of people and cargo from the point of origin to entry into 
the country. Inspections will be conducted when deemed appropriate. 
Military and law enforcement response is the fourth layer of security. 
The strategy calls for a “well trained, properly equipped and ready maritime security 
force from both the U.S. Armed Forces and national, regional, state and local law 
enforcement agencies to detect, deter, interdict and defeat any potential adversary.”19     
The success of the National Maritime Strategy depends upon integrating 
public/private security efforts through the shared use of intelligence, resources, 
communication and shared situational awareness. 
 
                                                 
17 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 20. 
18 Ibid., 21 
19 Ibid., 22 
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The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) includes the 
following eight supporting implementation plans:  
1. The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness 
2. The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan  
3. The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan 
4. The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy 
5. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan 
6. Maritime Transportation System Security Plan 
7. Maritime Commerce Security Plan 
8. The Domestic Outreach Plan 
The aforementioned plans work in concert to enhance MDA for a more 
effective approach to homeland security and defense of the United States of America.  
While each of these plans are written by the federal government, the applicability 
stretches across jurisdictional boundaries from private maritime stakeholders to local, 
state and federal partners. 
The foundational crux of many of these plans establishes the means by 
which to better share information and communicate more effectively among the entities 
responsible for enhancing MDA and overall preparedness and emergency response 
capabilities.  
2. Network Theories and Frameworks 
Outlining the military theory Network Centric Warfare—showing its applicability 
to the civilian realm and the Cycle of Preparedness are paramount in understanding how 
the two can compliment each other to assist in MDA and overall port security efforts.  
Chapter four will detail the theory and framework to provide background information to 
establish a foundation on which to proceed. Chapter five applies the theory and model to 
the maritime complex, describing how using each of the principles will address a 
particular port security need and/or process thus perpetuating the Cycle of Preparedness. 
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a. Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for 
Terrorist Threats 
In the “Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for 
Terrorist Threats,” William V. Pelfrey identifies the need for governmental and non-
governmental entities to follow a strategic framework for agencies to prepare in stages.20  
According to Pelfrey, simply arguing the fact of preparedness “…is hollow without a 
framework.” Similarly, to argue that we are unprepared without clearly specifying how 
preparedness can be attained is insufficient to accomplishing the goal of preparedness.”21 
 
 
Figure 1. Major Elements of the Cycle of Preparedness 
 
Several plans, including the National Response Plan (NRP) and the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS),22  establish processes to implement 
national level plans in preparing for disasters.  However, theses plans operate in a linear 
manner and progress through prevention, preparedness, response and finally recovery; 
usually referred to during and after an attack.  “The Cycle” focuses on preparedness as a 
whole and uses collaboration and information sharing as a means to facilitate the four 
phases to preparedness.  According to Pelfrey, these elements include; Prevention, 
Awareness, Response and Recovery.23 
b. Network Centric Warfare Theory  
The term “Network-Centric Warfare” (NCW) is a military term used to 
describe a common overarching theory to obtain and link various forms of intelligence, 
                                                 
20 Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats” 6. 
21 Ibid., 1 
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, (March 1, 2004),   
U.S. Department for Homeland Security, National Response Plan , (December, 2004): 2-4.   





























process it and distribute it back out to the battle zone for dominant Battle Space 
Awareness (BSA) or common operating picture.  BSA is defined by the Department of 
Defense as,”, “The knowledge and understanding of the operational area's environment, 
factors, and conditions, including the status of friendly and adversary forces, neutrals and 
noncombatants, weather and terrain, that enables timely, relevant, comprehensive and 
accurate assessments, in order to successfully apply combat power, protect the force 
and/or complete the mission.” 24  The term “Network-Centric Operations” (NCO) is the 
process of implementing NCW. 
NCW contains four basic tenets: 
1) A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
2) Information sharing increases the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness. 
3) This quality information and shared situational awareness enables 
collaboration and self-synchronization, while enhancing sustainability and speed of 
command. 
4) These upgrades, in turn, provide the mechanism of advantage for 
increased mission capabilities.   
The above tenets are supported by the following nine governing 
principles:25 
1) Information Superiority 
2) Shared Awareness  
3) Speed of Command  
4) Self-synchronization  
5) Dispersed forces  
6) Demassification  
                                                 
24 Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Implementation of 
Network-Centric Warfare. (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 5, 2005), 3. 
25 Ibid., 8.  
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7)  Deep Sensor Reach  
8) Alter Initial Conditions  
9) Compressed Operations 
These principles provide direction for operations in the Information Age.  
Both NCW tenets and principles are discussed at length in Chapter IV. 
Both NCW theory and the Cycle of Preparedness can be applied to 
effectuate a higher level of MDA by including the private sector for a common operating 
picture and thereby improving port security.  Utilizing the theory (NCW) to achieve and 
sustain the framework (The Cycle) creates basis from which to perpetuate networked 
collaboration and information sharing to facilitate preparation for preventing, protecting, 
responding and recovering from any disaster, natural or manmade in a port complex. 
 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The Cycle of Preparedness26  framework, integrated with the tenets of Network 
Centric Operations, forms an architectural framework on which a solid regional 
collaborative program could be designed to embrace the private sector as a partner in port 
security.  Dr. Pelfrey’s model, supported by the tenets and principles of network centric 
warfare, is used as a template based on the four phases of prevention, preparedness, 
response and recovery. It also reviews existing programs used to facilitate public/private 
collaboration.  Both theories are proven and accepted as independent models27 used 
within the United States military as well as within Homeland Security models and 
frameworks. 
1. Interview and Survey Method 
The interview and survey method was used to assess the needs of port 
stakeholders and to determine where gaps presently exist the collaboration process.    The 
interviews and surveys reached out to multiple stakeholders, all of whom have a portion 
                                                 
26 Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats.”  
27 The models have not been previously integrated and applied to port security.   
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of responsibility for securing critical infrastructure in the LA/LB Port Complex.  The 
stakeholders include the Long Beach Police and Harbor Departments, the Los Angeles 
Port Police, The U.S. Coast Guard and The Los Angeles Police and Sheriffs Department.  
Facility security officers (FSO’s) in the private sector such as American Presidential 
Lines, Long Beach Container Terminal, Maersk, Hanjin, SSA Marine Terminals and 
several representatives from the oil industry such as British Petroleum, Shell and 
Amerigas refineries also participated. 
2. Case Study 
a. Securing the Port of New York and New Jersey: Network-Centric 
Operations Applied to the Campaign against Terrorism  
This thesis also utilizes the case study method to examine the Stevens 
Institute Net-Centric analysis which was applied to the New York/New Jersey Port.28    
The structure, conception, sustainability and measurable results are examined as to its 
suitability and applicability in a national framework. 
This report is especially relevant to this thesis due to its insightful analysis 
of the maritime industry as it encompasses a port complex (New York/New Jersey) with 
similar goals and attention paid to the private stakeholders.  The outcome of this report 
outlines maritime threats, assessments, and network architectures, standardization of risk 
assessments, information architectures and Network centric approaches. 
The Stevens Institute of Technology conducted a security analysis of the 
Port of New York/New Jersey and applied the concept of network centric operations.29  
The theory, as explained in the case of the NY/NJ Port, utilizes a net-centric approach to 
close the gaps in homeland security, particularly in jurisdictionally-challenged locations.  
The operative goal in this concept leverages new technology to integrate prevention, 
response and recovery through constant collaboration among all port stakeholders.   
The study outlines an immediate need for a national and regional 
architecture that links federal, state, local and city organization that have the 
                                                 
28 This concept has been used throughout the military. 
29 Securing the Port of New York and New Jersey: Network-Centric Operations Applied to the 
Campaign Against Terrorism (Hoboken: Stevens Institute of Technology, 2004).  
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responsibility, authority or stake in matters of homeland security.  This architecture, as 
described by Stevens Institute,30 provides a means to facilitate sharing of information 
across the key public and private organizations operating in the port region, plus a system 
to test, evaluate and train. 
Second, the architecture should serve as a library or collection point for 
assembling and categorizing the many and diverse port security programs, projects and 
other initiatives currently underway. No such single collection agency exists, 
handicapping the ability to coordinate and exchange vital information and knowledge.  
Third, a crucial part of the implementation process focuses on human 
factors, especially in the area of preparing for complex emergencies and becoming more 
reactive and efficient during events. 
Fourth, the architecture can construct an electronic and cyber backbone 
linking the many agencies. The backbone must be secure, redundant, reliable, accessible 
and affordable. It must also possess sufficient redundancy to prevent and close 
communications gaps. 
Stevens Study uses the Network Centric Theory and applies it to the port 
environment from the strategic level and then based upon the findings, develops a set of 
recommendations to be implemented in a test bed.  This thesis examines the nine 
governing principles supporting Network Centric Operations, and then assesses and 
applies them to port security vulnerabilities to strengthen overall maritime security.  
Furthermore, the overall recommendations made by the report will be reviewed as well as 
a process by which these recommendations are being implemented in a pilot program in 
the Los Angeles/ Long Beach Port Complex . 
                                                 
30 Securing the Port of New York and New Jersey: Network-Centric Operations Applied to the 
Campaign Against Terrorism (Hoboken: Stevens Institute of Technology, 2004) p.44 
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II. MARITIME COMPLEXITIES AND PROGRAMS 
A. MARITIME COMPLEXITIES 
Stakeholders in The United States currently operate 361 ports dispersed 
throughout the country, each having unique needs and challenges yet linked by 
waterborne trade.  Each port operates a bit differently depending on the type and function 
of the port and level of intermodality.  Some are major hubs of container distribution, 
some are major military staging points and still others are responsible for the nation’s oil 
supply. However, one major commonality is the inherent vulnerability of each.  
Compounding the problem, many ports are located near major metropolitan areas, 
employ a large workforce and are geographically difficult to secure. 
In 2005, The Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management released 
U.S. Port Security Policy after 9/11: Overview and Evaluation.31  The following 
explanations of maritime/port complexities are contained within this report: 
(1) Volume: An enormous amount of goods flow through the maritime supply 
chain.  In 2004 alone, America handled almost 20 million ocean containers.  This number 
has certainly risen in 2005 and growth is expected to continue to rise throughout the next 
twenty years. 
(2) Intermodality: As ships enter the port the cargo is met with both rail and truck 
to disperse goods as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
(3) Jurisdictional issues: The jurisdictional issues as noted earlier are intricate and 
potentially difficult as federal, state, local and private entities all have a piece of 
responsibility for security.  
(4) Quantity of stakeholders: Carriers, shipping lines, labor unions, trucking 
companies, vessel tracking and pilot companies should be working together to secure 
commerce. 
                                                 
31 Jon D. Havemen, Howard J.Shatz and Ernesto Vilchis. “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing 
Security and Cost,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management2, no. 4 2005, article 1 
(2005), www.bepress.com [Accessed January 1, 2007] 4. 
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(5) Global nature of business: The nature of the shipping industry is global; 
therefore, any comprehensive approach to port security must involve foreign partners. 
(6) Time sensitivity: Every delay of commerce is money lost and services denied.  
Manufacturers rely on and plan for a steady stream of merchandise. 
(7) Public and Private Interests: Sharing propriety information remains an issue.  
Each entity expects the other to finance security efforts. At times regulatory requirements 
impede the smooth and timely flow of commerce.  
For example, the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Complex is one of the most 
complicated maritime jurisdictions struggling to cohesively combine public/private 
efforts to enhance port security.  The port operates amidst a metropolitan area of more 
than 10 million people with a labor force of almost 7.5 million and a median annual 
household income of $46,000. The twin ports account for 111 million tons of seaborne 
trade each year. It is the fifth-largest port complex in the world after Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Shanghai, and Shenzhen.32 
The twin ports’ combined import/export trade flow of $250 billion in 2004 is 
equivalent to about 30 percent of the greater Los Angeles gross regional product.  
Imports are five times larger than exports, and about half of the imports and two-thirds of 
the exports are to and from areas beyond the Los Angeles region.33  This port is a 
strategic economic hub affecting the entire nation’s economy. 
Although the twin ports operate on a much larger scale than most, the 
jurisdictional complexities remain important in ports throughout the country.  Multiple 
public and private entities, striving for security while balancing the flow of commerce, 
have no easy task, even in the most basic environments. 
Post 9/11 saw the creation of an overall response framework with the advent of 
several security initiatives. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) is 
included in this framework.  The MTSA creates overall national, area, facility and vessel 
                                                 
32 Jon D. Havemen, Howard J.Shatz and Ernesto Vilchis. “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing 
Security and Cost,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management2, no. 4 2005, article 1 
(2005), www.bepress.com [Accessed January 1, 2007] 73.  
33 Ibid., 75.  
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security plans; security response plans; the development of a worker identification card; 
rapid response boarding teams; vessel tracking systems; and the Area Maritime Security 
Committee (AMSC).34   Several other programs such as The Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Operation Safe 
Commerce (OSC) have been created to facilitate both cooperative security measures as 
well as better regulate potentially harmful cargo in support of MDA. 
 
B. MARITIME VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS  
1. C-TPAT 
C-TPAT is beyond question, the largest and most successful government-
private sector partnership to emerge from the ashes of 9/11 
- Robert C. Bonner 
The C-TPAT program calls for business and government to work cohesively to 
secure and strengthen the supply chain.  This program is voluntary and operates on a 
layered approach to securing cargo from port of debarkation to the port of call.  The 
layers begin with security procedures, container security, physical access control, 
procedural security, security training and threat assessment, physical security, and 
information technology.35  
2. Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
In January 2002, Commissioner Bonner, head of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), announced the CSI program.  CSI puts Customs officials in ports 
around the world to target high risk containers that may pose a terrorism risk. 
 
 
                                                 
34 United States Coast Guard, Area Maritime Security Committee Charter (2004), 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/MTSA_Orientation/ams_overview.htm [Accessed January 1, 2007]. 
35 United States Customs and Border Protection, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/security_guideline/guideline_port.xml 
[Accessed January 2, 2007] 
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The four core elements of CSI include:36 
• Identify high-risk containers.  CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify 
containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance 
information and strategic intelligence.  
• Prescreen and evaluate containers before they are shipped.  Containers are 
screened as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of 
departure.  
• Use technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can 
be done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade.  This 
technology includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation 
detection devices.  
• Use smarter, more secure containers, which allows CBP officers at United 
States ports of arrival to identify containers that have been tampered with 
during transit. 
3. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
Operation Safe Commerce is a pilot program designed to encourage deployment 
of technologies for ensuring containers’ security as they move through the supply chain. 
A wide range of information technologies will be tested which include intrusion 
detection, container sealing and global positioning systems.  The overall goal of OSC is 
to establish and determine best practices, policies and procedures for safe shipping that 
use technology to enhance security. 
C-TPAT, CSI and OSC are intended to work in a cohesive environment with both 
the private sector and members from foreign governments.  In port environments around 
the United States, several collaborative programs have been established in an attempt to 
open communication and intelligence dissemination to achieve better MDA.  Although 
the following programs have been implemented, no method currently exists to link them.  
                                                 
36 United States Customs and Border Protection, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/security_guideline/guideline_port.xml 
[Accessed January 2, 2007].  
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Connecting them alleviates the inherent stovepipes that lead to failed collaborative efforts 
as decried by the National Maritime Strategy and several other Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives.  Instead a robust network of networks would alleviate the “silos” 
we currently operate in and portray a common operating picture among all stakeholders. 
 
C. MANDATORY PROGRAMS37  
The following programs were written and implemented in response to increasing 
maritime security as part of the MTSA.    These new regulations enable Customs officials 
as well as the Captain of the Port (COTP) to be aware of the specific vessels, commerce 
and crew entering U.S. Ports prior to the actual arrival of the ship. 
• 96 hour Advance Notification of Arrival 
• 24 hour Advance Cargo Manifest filing 
• International Maritime Organization regulations  
• Immigration and Naturalization Service Crewmember Security Plans 
 
D. PUBLIC/PRIVATE PROGRAMS 
1. InfraGard 
One of the best known intelligence products geared towards the private sector is 
InfraGard.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created InfraGard in the Cleveland 
Field Office in 1996. It was a local effort to gain support from the information technology 
industry and academia for the FBI’s investigative efforts in the cyber arena. In 1998 the 
FBI assigned national program responsibility for InfraGard to the former National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC).  They have developed a relationship of trust and 
credibility in the exchange of information concerning various terrorism, intelligence, 
criminal and security matters.38   
                                                 
37 This is not all inclusive of the newly imposed security regulations, it is merely a sampling.     
38 Federal Bureau of Investigation Infragard www.infragard.net/about_us/facts.htm [Accessed 
December 30, 2006]. 
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InfraGard is an information sharing and analysis effort serving the interests and 
combining the knowledge base of a wide range of members. At its most basic level, 
InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector. InfraGard is an 
association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement 
agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to  
 
prevent hostile acts against the United States.39  The Los Angeles chapter of Infragard 
has developed a robust outreach initiative within the Maritime industry and has held 
several meetings in the Port of LA/LB. 
The network of InfraGard is growing.  It provides a useful tool for the FBI to 
reach out to the private sector.40  The information and training available from the federal 
level remains a vital component to homeland security and should continue to be 
accessible to the private sector.  This program should be considered and included in any 
overarching intelligence architecture. 
2. Homeport 
The United States Coast Guard has developed an information sharing program 
entitled Homeport.  Federal Maritime Security Coordinators use Homeport as a primary 
means for the day-to-day management and communication of port security matters with 
Area Maritime Security Committee members, commercial vessel and facility owners and 
operators, government partners and the public. Homeport affords instant access to 
support increased information sharing requirements amongst federal, state, local and 
industry decision makers for security management and increased maritime domain 
awareness.41 
Homeport is a publicly accessible internet portal providing all users with current 
maritime security information. It also serves as the Coast Guard's communication tool 
                                                 
39 Federal Bureau of Investigation Infragard www.infragard.net/about_us/facts.htm [Accessed 
December 30, 2006]. 
40 This program is a one way communication system 
41 United States Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/pdf/final33cfr103.pdf [Accessed 
January 10, 2007]. 
 19
designed to support the sharing, collection and dissemination of sensitive but unclassified 
information to targeted groups of registered users within the port community. As with 
InfraGard, Homeport is a vital tool in use by the Coast Guard, and it should be included 
in a larger networked architecture. 
3. Area Maritime Security Committee  
One of the mandates established by the MTSA was the designation of each 
Captain of the Port (COTP) as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC).  The 
FMSC appoints an Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) to coordinate with 
industry partners to develop a comprehensive plan to further port security.42  For 
example, the LA/LB COTP is the head of the Central California Area Maritime Security 
Committee (CCAMSC).  They have defined the sector’s mission as: Identify potential 
threats, improve security measures and procedures, improve communications, decrease 
vulnerabilities, coordinate contingency planning and conduct exercises. 
Currently, the CCAMSC meets quarterly and is comprised of local, county, state, 
federal and industry representatives. The major accomplishments as noted by previous 
COTP Peter Neffenger43 include the creation and publication of the first ever AMS Plan 
for Port Hueneme and the Ports of Los Angeles–Long Beach; improved response 
protocols; increased interagency operability; enhanced interagency communications; 
facilitated joint agency operations during heightened security alerts; and coordinated 
Incident Command Structure (ICS) training for maritime stakeholders.44 
4. Joint Terrorism Task Force Critical Infrastructure Squad  
During 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created the first JTTF in 
New York in response to an overwhelming number of bank robberies that were occurring 
in the city. The concept of the task force was successful and was soon applied to counter 
                                                 
42 United States Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/pdf/final33cfr103.pdf [Accessed 
January 10, 2007]. 
43 Captain Neffenger was reassigned to USCG Headquarters in Washington D.C.. The current COTP 
is  Paul Weidenhoft.   
44United States Coast Guard, www.uscg.mil/d11/sectorlalb/documents/AMS101.ppt - 2006-01-24 
[Accessed January 10, 2007]. 
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terrorism measures.  The current JTTF’s primary responsibility is to respond to and 
investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist-related criminal activity. They proactively 
investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals targeting or operating 
within the United States for the purpose of detecting, preventing and prosecuting their 
criminal activity.  Theses collaborative investigative teams are currently housed in 100 
cities nationwide, including at least one in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices.45 
Due to the increasing demands of securing our nation’s critical infrastructure and 
the increasing emphasis placed on maritime security, the FBI created a new Critical 
Infrastructure JTTF.  This squad’s area of responsibility is the LA/LB port complex and 
includes critical infrastructures in and around the port such as oil refineries and rail lines.  
This “Port Squad” is comprised of local law enforcement agencies and federal agents 
assigned to this busy seaport.  Established in October 2005, the squad resides in the Long 
Beach Residence Area of the Los Angeles Field Office of the FBI and works with 
industry partners as well as maintains the vice chair on the AMSC to foster a 
collaborative environment conducive to enhancing MDA. 
As evidenced by the increase in port security grant funding, the guidelines within 
the MTSA and recently imposed security programs; the nation has made great strides in 
both increasing MDA and securing critical infrastructure.  The added value of partnering 
with private industry is indisputable as displayed by the creation of Infragard, Homeport 
and the AMSC. Yet a gap still exists in connectively as these programs operate 
independently of each other.  Currently, not one network links all of the agencies (public 
and private) with port security initiatives and collaborative programs. 
To facilitate a common operating picture among all port stakeholders to enhance 
mission effectiveness (port security), a networked program should be established to link 
all of these valuable port security efforts together. Linked connectivity and cooperation 
among all stakeholders creates an environment wherein security efforts and disaster 
preparedness would grow within the private sector.  Knowing that it is impossible to  
 
                                                 
45 Federal Bureau of Investigation http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec04/jttf120114.htm. [Last Accessed 
January 2, 2007]. 
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prevent every attack by a determined terrorist, this connectivity also fosters and enables 
the flow of commerce. Port companies can conduct their business continuity plans, thus 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 23
III. SURVEY FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A regional survey was conducted in the LA/LB Port Complex and included 
federal state and local law enforcement as well as private facility security officers tasked 
with securing a variety of facilities in the port.  The purpose of the survey determines the 
level of information sharing/collaboration within each sector independently as well as 
between the private sector and public sector.  The survey was widely completed by 
representatives from all sectors, and it provides helpful insight on the issues at hand. 
 
B. INSTRUMENT CONSTRUCTION 
The Port Intelligence Survey was distributed to six intelligence subject matter 
experts from private, local, county, state and federal jurisdictions. Minor adjustments 
were made to the questions based on their expert feedback.  The five point Likert forced 
choice46 scale method was used in the construction of the survey.  The four responses 
start with “strongly disagree” on one end to “strongly agree” on the other end. 
The survey was prepared for “Zoomerang” online distribution and included 19 
questions in 5 categories.  The categories consisted of: 
Collaboration  
Intelligence sharing  
Situational awareness  
Training   
Procedural information   
The survey is designed with five questions investigating aspects of the 
collaboration category, four questions deal with the intelligence category and three ask 
                                                 
46  Forced option scale eliminates the middle option of “neither agree nor disagree”. This forces the 
participant to make a decision towards the affirmative or negative; removing neutrality.  
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situational awareness questions.  Two are procedural questions, the training category asks 
three questions and two questions are designed to indicate employment.   
The survey was distributed to 119 recipients, which comprises an accurate 
representation of the administrative, operational and strategic concerns of the port. Two 
respondents from the initial sample pool chose not to participate, one survey was 
undeliverable and, after further research, it was determined that six potential participants 
were no longer employed at the original and related assignments.  Of the original 119 
potential recipients, 51 fully completed the survey, and 5 partially completed the 
instrument. The respondents made a total of 67 visits to the survey site.   Of the 
participating sample pool, the respondents were divided fairly evenly with approximately 
51% representing the private sector and 49% representing the public (law enforcement) 
sector. 
 
C. SURVEY FINDINGS 
The survey validates the research hypothesis. Serious gaps exist in the areas of 
communication, intelligence dissemination, training and standard operating procedures. 
A lack of situational awareness persists which prevents a common operating picture 
throughout the port.  The most relevant data from the survey supporting the preceding 
statement was extracted and highlighted in the following five categories. 
Collaboration 
In the area of collaboration, 94% of respondents indicate they need more 
public/private collaboration to improve prevention, protection, response and recovery. 
Ninety-six percent think a networked system including intelligence dissemination, clear 
reporting procedures and situational updates would be useful in securing critical 
infrastructure.  Only 43% are satisfied with public/private communication. 
Intelligence 
In the intelligence category, only 42%of the respondents were satisfied or very 
satisfied with the intelligence they received, and 46% percent thought the intelligence 
was actionable.  Seventy-one percent of the private sector respondents report receiving 
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intelligence bulletins on a seldom (monthly) or never basis, compared to 83.3% of their 
law enforcement counterparts, who report receiving intelligence products daily or 
weekly. 
Situational Awareness 
When respondents were asked how useful situational awareness (what is 
occurring throughout the port) would be for daily operations, 96% of the respondents 
reply useful or very useful.  Conversely, only 30% report receiving updates on a daily or 
even weekly basis. 
Training  
In the area of disaster/terrorism training, 96% of the respondents agree more 
training would benefit their respective organizations. Only 36% report being satisfied 
with the amount of training they receive to secure critical infrastructure.  
Procedures  
Only 38% report that standard operating procedures exist between public/private 
stakeholders. 
Miscellaneous Comments 
The following comments are posted anonymously:  
• “Too many agencies, no central point of contact or source of information 
in the port area.” 
• “More communication is needed at all levels.  Information is sent to us; 
however, it is not in a timely manner. We usually have to solicit for 
information that is useful for us to operate efficiently during a crisis.” 
The data, as well as the additional comments, underscores the gap in collaboration 
between the public/private entities within the port complex.  The following section 




D. LIMITATIONS OF THE SURVEY 
The sample pool was taken from researcher’s contacts, affiliates of the United 
States Coast Guard and Area Maritime Security Committee Members.   The survey was 
distributed to 24 public law enforcement and 26 facility security officers.  The 
participants were comprised of public and private entities from the LA/LB port complex 
and may or may not necessarily reflect the opinions of other ports across the country.  
This narrow pool sample represents one of the limitations of this survey and may reflect 
the biases of the geographical region.  The research finds the results of the survey 
compatible with the research hypothesis, but it is not statistically binding.  For further 
data included in the survey see appendix. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
Although many changes have occurred in homeland security since 9/11, the 
results of the survey underscore the need for a more structured and robust public/private 
collaboration.  Both sectors recognize the need for more timely information and the 
benefits derived from that exchange.  The road ahead utilizes technology to develop an 
architecture which facilitates the needs as described within the survey.  The theory and 
framework to accomplish this arduous task are detailed throughout this thesis. 
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IV. NCW THEORY & THE “CYCLE” 
A. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE THEORY 
The term “Network Centric” originated in military operations and is gaining 
acceptance in the civilian world as well.  “Network Centric Warfare” is the theory and 
“Network Centric Operations” is the implementation of the theory.  “NCW focuses on the 
combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or networking of the 
warfighting enterprise.  It is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed 
forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared battlespace awareness that 
can be exploited via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to achieve 
commanders intent.”47  NCW supports speed of command—the conversion of superior 
information position to action.  NCW is transparent to mission, force size and geography.  
Furthermore, NCW has the potential to contribute to the coalescence of the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels of war.  In brief, NCW is not narrowly about technology, 
but broadly about an emerging military response to the Information Age.”48      
Alberts, Garstka and Stein describe three key concepts of NCW, and they support 
both the theory and applicability of the theory.  The first concept utilizes geographically 
dispersed forces and addresses the previous limitation of the military ability to: 1) 
communicate, 2) move and 3) project effects, forces needed to be collocated or in close 
proximity to the enemy or target they were defending.  Due to these constraints, a 
geographically dispersed force is weak49. 
The second concept is a knowledgeable force obtained by steady information in a 
timely manner. By effectively utilizing the information gained, ground forces can 
evaluate the situation and make decisions quickly based on the totality of information. 
When applied to the battle space, a common operating picture enhances battle space 
knowledge. 
                                                 
47 Commanders intent is defined as; A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the 
desired end state. 
48 D.S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka, and F. P. Stein. “Network Centric Warfare:  Developing and Leveraging 
Information Superiority,”  CCRP Publications Distribution Center (1999), 15. 
49 Ibid., 90 
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Third, entities gain effective linking in the battle space.  Effective linking requires 
the establishment of a robust, high performance information infrastructure or 
infostructure that provides all elements of the warfighting enterprise with access to high-
quality information services50 
 
B. FOUR TENETS OF NCW  
1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness.  
3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-
synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command. 
4. These three improvements dramatically increase mission effectives.  
 
C. NINE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES  
According to the Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation (DoD-
OFT), 51 the following nine principles52 support the tenets of NCW: 
Information Superiority: Create information advantages through timeliness, 
accuracy and relevance.  Increase enemy’s information needs, reduce his ability to access 
information and raise his uncertainty; Assure our own information access through a well 
networked and interoperable force. Decrease our own information needs by exploiting 
our collectors. 
Shared Awareness: Translate information and knowledge into common 
understanding and situational awareness for all participants.  Build a network of 
networks, populated with quality intelligence and non-intelligence data to allow security  
 
                                                 
50 D.S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka, and F. P. Stein. “Network Centric Warfare:  Developing and Leveraging 
Information Superiority,”  CCRP Publications Distribution Center (1999), 91- 92.  
51 Director, Force Transformation., 8. 
52 Although a military theory is being described; the principles have been written in this thesis as it 
applies to the civilian world and specifically port security.    
 29
forces to build shared awareness. Information users (private sector) must also become 
suppliers by posting information in a timely manner; Maintain secure networks and 
information that can be defended.    
Speed of Command and Decision Making: Recognize information advantage 
and convert it to competitive advantage by developing process and procedures otherwise 
impossible.  Through port security innovation and adaptation, make quicker decisions to 
turn information advantage into decision superiority and decisive effects. Block 
adversary’s options and achieve enhanced security.     
Self-Synchronization: Enable field level law enforcement and private security 
forces to operate almost autonomously and to redirect themselves through shared 
awareness and the commander’s (leaders) intent. Increase the value of subordinate 
initiative to increase operational tempo and responsiveness. Assist in execution of 
commander’s intent.  Adapt to developing occurrences in the port complex.   
Dispersed Forces: Move security forces from the traditionally deployed locations 
(stations/departments) to dispersed operations.  Emphasize functional control versus 
physical occupation of the port and generate effective security power at the proper time 
and place. Increase intelligence, operations and logistics to achieve precise effects and 
gain global advantage with dispersed forces.  
Demassification: Change from an approach based on geographically linked 
police and security forces to one based upon achieving effects.  Use information to 
achieve desired effects without having to deploy mass physical forces within a specific 
geographical location. Increase tempo and speed of movement throughout the port 
complex to harden the critical infrastructure, complicating an opponent’s target problem.   
Deep Sensor Reach: Expand use of deployable, distributed and networked 
sensors,53 both distant and proximate, that detect actionable information on items of 
interest at operationally relevant ranges to achieve decisive effects.  Leverage 
increasingly persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Use sensors to gain 
                                                 
53 Sensors include all entities that contribute to battle space awareness from satellites to “eyes on the 
ground.”  
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and maintain information superiority. Exploit sensors as a deterrent when employed 
visibly as part of an overt display on intent. Enable every source to be a sensor, from the 
individual officer to a satellite. 
After Initial Conditions:  Exploit the principles of high-quality shared 
awareness, dynamic self-synchronization, dispersed and de-massed forces, deep sensor 
reach, compressed operations and levels of security, and rapid speed of command to 
enable the joint force to swiftly identify, adapt to and change an opponents operating 
context to our advantage.  Historically, the close coupling in time of critical events have 
profoundly impacted the enemy, both psychologically (as a deterrent) and in locking out 
potential attacks. 
Compressed Operations: Eliminate procedural boundaries between 
public/private collaboration entities within processes. Joint operations are conducted at 
the lowest organizational levels possible to achieve rapid and decisive effects.  Increase 
collaboration in speed of deployment, employment and sustainment. Eliminate the 
compartmentalization of processes (e.g., organize, deploy, employ and sustain) and 
functional areas (e.g., operations, intelligence and logistics).  Eliminate structural 
boundaries to merge capabilities at the lowest possible organizational levels, e.g. joint 
operations at the organizational/officer/security guard levels. 
The following diagram54 depicts the networking of the NCW principles through 
an informational, cognitive, social and physical domain.  The informational knowledge 
allows the actors to move into awareness allowing for collaboration and the necessary 










                                                  




Figure 2. Network Centric Theory 
 
The Cycle of Preparedness 
 
D. THE FRAMEWORK  
Dr. Pelfrey describes a framework by which to accomplish an “auto adaptive” 
55capacity in organizations tasked with preventing, responding to and recovering from 
attacks.  The framework starts with Prevention, accomplished through Collaboration and 
Information Sharing as primary elements.  Threat Recognition, Risk Management and 
Intervention are additional elements, followed by Awareness that an event is occurring.  
The Response category is next, best characterized as emergency response activities. 
Consequence Management and Recovery to revitalize the jurisdictions is the final 
element in the cycle.56 
The issue of preparedness is a primary goal of the Department of Homeland 
Security. Almost without exception, each new strategy, whether it is local, state or 
                                                 
55 Louise Comfort, “Institutional Re-orientation and Change: Security as a Learning Strategy,” The 
Forum 1, no. 2 (2002a): 1-5. Auto Adaptive is defined as “system of interacting units, each performing at 
its own rate but adjusting that performance to that of its near-neighbors in response to incoming 
information from the environment.” 
56  The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats, William V. 
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federal, contains a component of preparation. However, as Pelfrey points out, the vision 
has not been clearly articulated or swiftly adopted.  The following phases are parts of the 
cycle described individually, but together outline a framework to implement an overall 
preparedness strategy that is iterative, as opposed to the standard linear configuration of 
preparation. 
 
E. THE FOUR PHASES 
1. Prevention 
Prevention is divided into five distinct elements: Collaboration, Information 
Sharing, Threat Recognition, Risk Management and Intervention.  The two most 
important overarching elements to facilitate prevention is “Collaboration” and 
“Information sharing.” 
Collaboration represents the most essential aspect of all. If organizations cannot 
work together, the other elements are incomplete and disjointed.   Furthermore, 
collaboration includes collegiality, trust, flexibility, openness, mutual respect, social 
capital and pathways of communication.57  
As collaboration is established, a pathway to information sharing increases 
frequency, validity and reliability of data.  Information sharing, gathering and 
disseminating are crucial to prepare against acts of terrorism. Without it, any 
collaborative process will halt.  Organizations must address two prerequisite elements: 
threat recognition and target hardening and intervention.  If information sharing and 
collaboration are established, authorities can effectively identify threats, risks and 
vulnerabilities, properly harden targets and prevent an attack. 
2. Awareness 
The response process requires the knowledge or awareness that the event is 
occurring.  This stage in the Cycle of Preparedness segues between pre-incident 
                                                 
57 Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats,” 
10. 
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prevention and post incident response.58  The quicker organizations are aware of an 
incident regardless of the planning or operational stage, the better chance of stopping the 
incident from happening or at least mitigating its effects. 
3. Response 
Response is the next category within preparedness and perhaps one of the most 
discussed and exercised.  This phase relies on taking immediate action once a threat 
emerges. According to The Cycle, these actions include containment and control of a 
scene, incident management, mitigation, investigation and the preservation of life as a top 
priority. 
4. Recovery 
In accordance with the other three phases, it is crucial to prepare for recovery.  
The recovery process does not activate separate from response; it is not simply a linear 
process.  Some organizations will be in the recovery process while others may still be 
actively responding.  Nonetheless, the most effective and efficient way to prepare for 
recovery occurs through the use of good collaboration, planning and information sharing 
prior to and during an event. Pelfrey describes the following diagram as placing the 
elements in distinct phases to suggest a strategic model to integrate these elements and 
reflect a more complete version of the model.59 
                                                 
58Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats,” 
10.   
59 Ibid., 3. 
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Figure 3.   Terrorism Preparedness and Response Elements  
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V. NCW AND “CYCLE” MARITIME APPLICATIONS 
A. PRINCIPLES AND NCW APPLIED TO PORT ENVIRONMENT 
Network Centric Theory is appropriate and useful in developing architecture to 
enhance MDA. It closes the gaps between the public and private sector which currently 
render port security less effective.  The nine governing principles described in the 
preceding chapter are particularly relevant. Each component, when applied to a port 
security situation or gap, enhances overall security throughout the port complex.  This 
chapter implements NCW concepts as it applies operationally in the port complex with 
an emphasis on networking with the private sector. 
The progression from the Industrial age to the Information age changed many 
policies, procedures and ways of thinking.  The world operates in a vastly different 
sphere, and the theaters of war and homeland security are no exceptions.  The need for 
innovation and adaptation to confront today’s networked security threats birthed the 
NCW concept. Web technology is the foundational driver of that concept. 
Utilizing a virtual private network (VPN) allows public/private stakeholders to 
collaborate in a networked environment.  Once the VPN is installed and the stakeholders 
are connected, the technology creates a framework that applies the nine principles.   The 
following is an example of applying those principles using information technology to 
gain MDA and includes the private sector. 
Information Superiority 
A well-networked force creates a network of networks.60 For example, most of 
the private facilities in the port have sister companies throughout the world making the 
network global in nature.  The ability to disseminate and collect information worldwide at 
the speed of a button greatly enhances information superiority. 
Two-way information sharing allows the intelligence to be “pushed” down while 
at the same time allowing for information to be “pushed” up.  This information may 
                                                 
60 Network of networks refers to the linking of established networks with other established networks. 
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include requests for information on suspicious people, cargo or activity or the release of 
intelligence bulletins detailing the latest maritime threat information. 
Shared Awareness 
Several programs and intelligence databases61 currently exist in an effort to 
facilitate a relationship with the private sector. Most of these programs operate 
independently, creating potential stovepipes of gathered intelligence.   The networked 
system links these previously stove-piped systems and makes them easily accessible to 
both the public and private sectors in a central location.  Once the information is in a 
common location, it is easily disseminated and/or retrieved throughout the port complex 
for shared situational awareness. 
Dissemination of real time information represents another advantage of the 
network.  This information could include threat, planning or routine operational 
information allowing for continuity of operations; appropriate response measures; or even 
evacuation information.  As the survey indicates, shared awareness remains a vital 
component of port operations and is not currently in place 
For example, in LA/LB two major suspension bridges62 and one lift bridge63 links 
both sides of the port and Terminal Island.  Theses bridges not only serve as a link among 
the two cities, but they serve as the major ingress/egress routes for commerce entering 
and leaving the ports.  If one of the bridges reported a bomb threat or suspicious device, 
law enforcement would halt commerce in the affected area until they resolved the 
situation.  No mechanism currently exists to disseminate that information en masse, in 
real time to the industries so that they can re-route their commerce flow in line with 
business continuity plans, thus mitigating the effects of an attack or the mere threat of 
one.  That significant lack of shared awareness is vital to the economic supply chain. 
 
 
                                                 
61 As mentioned previously: Infragard, Homeport, Titan, DHS Bulletins 
62 Vincent Thomas and Gerald Thomas 
63 Schuyler Heim Bridge 
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Speed of Command and Decision Making 
The requirements for speed of command as it relates to port security are two-fold. 
The first requirement educates the players to recognize suspicious activity and anomalies 
prior to an actual threat.  The prior training theoretically enables instant threat 
recognition, and provides the means to report it throughout the complex in a timely 
manner.  Second, law enforcement agencies and the private sectors must agree upon and 
implement standard operating procedures (SOPs) including reporting procedures.  The 
combination of these two practices in the network enhances speed of command and 
decision making, hardening the target.   
Without the establishment of this principle, facility security officers feel obliged 
(and are sometimes encouraged) to call a host of law enforcement agencies looking for 
the correct one to respond to the ensuing incident.  This protocol creates frustration and 
hesitation to report seemingly innocuous events that when linked together could portray a 
more substantial threat. Businesses and government must make that link before rather 
than after an event to more effectively secure the domain. 
Self-Synchronization 
Training, exercising and establishing SOPs enable the private sector and field law 
enforcement units to operate virtually autonomously and execute commanders’ intent to 
mitigate a threat or incident in progress.  Situational reports perpetuate self-
synchronization, and shared awareness allows security units to rapidly respond to 
developing and changing events. 
Dispersed Forces/Demassification64 
Many private stakeholders in the port complex have security systems and 
technologies unrivaled by most government entities, specifically their impressive 
surveillance systems.  Leveraging the maritime industry’s surveillance capabilities  
 
 
                                                 
64 Demassification refers to effectively positioning security forces through information and other 
sensors  
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(without exploiting proprietary information) significantly increases a shared awareness, a 
common operating picture and the ability to place security personnel in the most 
vulnerable positions. 
Robust surveillance systems enable ground forces to disperse throughout the port 
according to the current intelligence information.  This manpower dispersal can redeploy 
quickly, utilizing speed of command and decision making.     
The ability to use technologies and intelligence in the port to conduct ground 
operations by positioning a reduced number of physical forces and logistics represents an 
application of dispersed forces and demassification.  
Deep Sensor Reach 
Sensors include all things contributing to battle space (maritime domain) 
awareness, from satellites to “eyes on the ground” and every capability in between.    As 
it applies to the civilian world, this definition includes surveillance technologies, all 
source intelligence collectors, tracking systems and human intelligence. 
The maritime industry is rich with intelligence source and global access.  The key 
is to network the “sensors” and leverage the information to maintain security awareness 
and superiority.  In the maritime arena this network includes linked surveillance camera 
systems, satellite tracking capabilities, connectivity with the C-TPAT and CSI initiatives, 
all source intelligence collectors (DHS, FBI, JRIC e.g.) and/or disseminators and 
customers of that product. 
After Initial Conditions/Compressed Operations 
Many of the governing principles are interwoven in a nonlinear manner, even 
when applied to port security needs, reflecting the essence and strength of NCW.  The 
establishment of networked systems and information flow and the emergence of an 
interlocking web appear to lessen the likelihood of a vital component slipping through. 
A prime component of compressed operations is the elimination of procedural 
boundaries by establishing SOPs and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) among 
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the participating sectors.  Compressed operations allow entities to work together even at 
the lowest operational levels, facilitating an environment of conjoined forces.      
 
B. NCW TRANSFORMS VULNERABILITIES INTO STRENGTHS 
Chapter II examines the inherent maritime complexities and vulnerabilities 
through the U.S. Port Security Policy after 9/11: Overview and Evaluation.  While the 
term “inherent” vulnerabilities in maritime security is applicable, NCW tenets can 
significantly harden and/or mitigate the weaknesses.  In several cases, applying centric 
theory can transform the vulnerabilities and capitalize on them as strengths.   The 
following section studies the listed vulnerabilities and 1) explains the process of 
mitigating the weakness and/or 2) illustrates the progression from vulnerability to 
networked superiority. 
Volume and Time Sensitivity—Trade growth in the maritime environment and 
throughout inter-modal supply chain is expected to grow exponentially in the next twenty 
years.  With that projection, security measures should not only include protective 
measures but strong response and recovery plans mitigating the effects of an attack.  The 
Maritime Commerce Security Plan65 states, “…(maritime supply chain security) will be 
achieved by creating a framework that will support the identification of threats as early as 
possible…improve the information available for risk management, invest in technology 
to identify threats, develop security requirements and work in partnership with industry 
and the international community to promote global supply chain security.”66 
Network Centric concepts enable the safer movement of large volumes of 
commerce in a timely manner by disseminating network information for Speed of 
Command and Decision Making.  Quickly determining the threat level prior to loading 
allows for more efficient distribution of commerce and time sensitive materials.     
                                                 
65 Maritime Commerce Security Plan (Washington D.C., October 2005): 5. 
66 Ibid., 5. 
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In the event of a disaster, networked concepts such as deep sensor reach, shared 
awareness, speed of command and decision-making significantly reduce the interruptions 
in the flow of commerce, mitigating effects to the supply chain regardless of volume.   
Programs such as C-TPAT and CSI partner with industry to streamline the flow of 
commerce, keeping with the demands of time-sensitive goods.  These programs 
encourage partners to strengthen security measures within their organizations and are 
rewarded with an expedited process through Customs.  
Intermodality—The maritime transportation system provides the backbone of the 
intermodal supply chain, and it is a complex chain including shipping, trucking and rail 
components.  The vulnerability lies within connecting all links in this supply chain for 
overall commerce security.  The NCW principles applied in a networked system actually 
convert this weakness into a supply chain strength by garnering information from 
multiple sources (deep sensor reach) and disseminating that information throughout the 
chain, increasing speed of command and decision-making effectiveness.        
Jurisdictional issues—The sheer number of law enforcement entities operating 
and affecting port operations is at times overwhelming.  Without proper communication 
and conjoined efforts among law enforcement entities, inevitable stovepipes create a 
complex weakness.  The successful attacks on 9/11 one of the major reasons the disaster 
was not stopped before it was initiated was The lack of communication among the 
intelligence community (vulnerability) enabled the successful attacks on 9/11 and 
prevented the disaster.  However, by sharing information though a networked system, 
your intelligence and information source has widened significantly alleviating stovepipes 
(strength).  
The greater law enforcement community (federal, state and local) realizes the 
benefits of collaboration as evidenced by the creation of the JRIC fusion center, JTTFs 
and the AMSC, specifically in the port environment.  However, these efforts are not 
linked through a cyber backbone and do not include private entities. By conjoining 
public/private efforts in a transparent environment, each organization brings their 
respective resources and expertise into the network, turning this vulnerability into a 
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strength.  It makes it easier and more likely to prevent future attacks because law 
enforcement and other entities can transcend the traditional barriers to communication.    
The greatest attributed strength of NCW (although several others apply) is how 
Information Superiority and Shared Awareness become part of the day-to-day 
effectiveness rather than a continuing vulnerability.   
Quantity of stakeholders—The sheer number of stakeholders in the port 
environment initially overwhelms.  A vast number of different industries work side by 
side (yet autonomously) to ensure the most effective distribution of goods.  Each 
organization is responsible for their respective piece of commerce flow and only come 
together when distribution requires it.  This economically driven fact impedes greater 
security in the ports.  
For example, in LA/LB Port Complex, some of the major private industries and 
organizations operating within the maritime arena (both on the water and shore side) 
include  container terminals (shipping lines); dry bulk and break bulk terminals; oil 
refineries; dock workers (International Longshoreman’s Warehouse Union); tug boat and 
pilot operators; pleasure craft marinas; and cruise ship terminals.   The diverse nature of 
the stakeholders, coupled with the number of separate entities potentially involved in 
sharing information in the port, clearly overwhelms traditional liner methods of 
dissemination. 
Communicating and collaborating with each of these disparate entities presents an 
arduous task which most certainly contributes to port security vulnerability.     However, 
many of these industries have self-organized into longstanding associations (networks) 
for their respective industries.  Leveraging the pre-established networks and creating a 
“network of networks” operating through the cyber backbone allows for transparency, 
connectivity and seamless information flow. When approached in a linear manner, that 
the network transforms the vulnerability to a strength.   This disparate mass of 
stakeholders transforms into a thriving network displaying the governing principles67 of 
NCW, in turn creating a common operating picture throughout the port and greatly 
enhancing MDA.                                                  
67 Details of the principles can be found in Chapter Four. 
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Public and Private interests—A delicate balance exists between the privacy 
rights of the industries engaged in free trade within the port and the increased security 
need. This challenge has been debated throughout government.  At times, the goals of the 
two seem contradictory. Regulatory requirements at times conflict with timely flow, 
creating vulnerability.  Chapter Four outlines several of the governing principles of NCW 
that both allow and thrive on public/private collaboration, therefore extending and 
supporting the much needed cycle of preparedness.  
Garnering the capabilities and expertise of each sector only strengthens the 
network.  The obstacles such as regulatory issues and proprietary information can be 
overcome by establishing SOP’s /MOU’s that clearly delineate roles and responsibilities 
of each sector.  The resources of private industry, including surveillance capabilities, 
specialty equipment and industry expertise, clearly play a role in strengthening 
prevention, response and recovery efforts. 
The Global nature of the maritime domain encompasses trade routes, 
communications links and natural resources vital to the global economy and the well-
being of people in the United States and around the world.68 The application of network 
centric operation thrives in this environment.  The strengths of the theory allow effective 
communication and operation through the established networks, regardless of geographic 
location.  In fact, the larger the geographic area, the increased need for the application of 
the theory and greater effectiveness of the operation due to the increase in information 
flow from a greater numbers of sensors leading to a larger common operating picture. 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security also addresses the need for global 
outreach and outlines it in the supporting plan entitled International Outreach and 
Coordination Strategy.   This strategy addresses specific goals of increasing MDA with 
specific strategic objectives.  The common thread throughout the plan coordinates and 
integrates maritime security across foreign, international and regional boundaries. 
Applying the tenets and governing principles of NCW transforms the reported 
maritime vulnerabilities and leverages them as strengths within the supply chain.  The 
                                                 
68 International Outreach and Coordination Strategy (Washington D.C., November 2005) : 1. 
 43
establishment of this network also creates a solid public/private relationship that is 
reinforced through a robust network with a growth potential for future trends 
 
C. NCW PERPETUATES “THE CYCLE” IN PORT SECURITY 
The Cycle of Preparedness provides a framework by which to prepare for any 
disaster in the port complex.   The process of preparedness as described in The Cycle 
contains multiple elements and phases.  It does not operate in a linear manner, much like 
network centric operations.  Pelfrey describes two predicate elements of the Cycle, 
collaboration and information–sharing, as “…enable[ing] agencies, jurisdictions, and 
organizations to effectively perform the other three elements of prevention, Threat 
Recognition, Target Hardening and Intervention.”   These predicate elements reflect the 
very tenets that facilitate NCW and enable the governing principles to support it. 
Other parallels emerge between the principles of network centric operation and 
the elements in the Cycle of Preparedness.  The term “auto-adaptive” is referred to as a 
process in readiness for terrorist threats. Pelfrey describes the Cycle as “…a dynamic, 
flexible, and continuous process of interaction and integration, and functioning as a self-
organizing mechanism that improves preparedness…”69 Both of these descriptions are 
very similar to the “net-centricity” aspects of NCW and relate specifically to self-
synchronization. 
Pelfrey states, “A key objective of the Cycle of Preparedness is to establish 
processes and tools within the framework of the preparedness cycle and if it [the Cycle] 
is operationalized properly, it should represent a ‘systematic effort to create change in the 
performance of the whole system' as described by Louise Comfort.”70  
Despite the many parallels among the theory and the framework maritime security 
can apply and perpetuate the Cycle framework through the application of network centric 
operations. 
                                                 
69 Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats,” 3. 
70 Comfort, Louise.  Institutional Re-orientation and Change: security as a learning Strategy.  The 
Forum.2002a. Volume 1, Number 2.pgs. 1-5. 
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The following diagram displays the individual domains as described by Pelfrey, 









































Figure 4. NCW and “Cycle” 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
“A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity 
and freedom in the rest of the world.  Economic growth supported by free trade and free 
markets creates new jobs and higher incomes.”71 The United States’ role in the global 
economy is absolutely paramount. The main pillar of that role is the nation’s position and 
influence on the economic supply chain. The vitality and integrity of that chain must be 
coveted and protected to the absolute best of our country’s ability. 
Over the last five years, congress has appropriated a total of $816 million for port 
security. The Coast Guard has stated that effective port security will cost $5.4 billion over 
ten years.72  In January of 2007, the latest round of grant funding was announced. The 
Port Security Grant Program is being allocated $201.2 million dollars to increase port 
security measures across the country73.  The monies invested by the federal government 
in the maritime industry have significantly increased in the past several years and testifies 
to the importance and emphasis of protecting and securing our economic vitality. 
The strategic and operational goals to ensure economic security as well as 
physical protection of our country require a robust Maritime Domain Awareness.  In the 
five years since the attacks on 9/11, our nation has undergone a significant change in the 
posture of our defense and security.  The sanctuary we once lived and worked in has 
vanished, and we are no longer impervious to outside attacks which threaten the freedom 
on which this nation was built. 
In an attempt to gain overarching MDA, the complexities and vulnerabilities in 
our country’s seaports must be conjoined and strengthened to effectively meet the goals 
described and the need for adequate security.  To see this goal to fruition, an environment  
 
                                                 
71 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  September, 2002. 
72 Robert Housman, “A Homeland Security Agenda for the First 100 Days of a Democratic-Led 
Congress,” Homeland Defense Journal (December 2006): 48. 
73 PSGP Round 7 Announced, $201 Million for the Nation's Seaports, January 9, 2007  
http://www.portsecuritynews.com [Accessed February 21, 2007]. 
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of collaboration and cohesiveness among all of the stakeholders in the maritime arena 
must become second nature—the intellectual framework and specific execution issues 
which this thesis provide . 
 
B. GAP IDENTIFICATION 
This thesis identifies several gaps in port security that are hindering the true 
effectiveness of maritime security and the much-needed maritime domain awareness.  
The lack of a cyber linked network system linking all port stakeholders, even in a region 
such as LA/LB, represents a significant gap that needs to be reconciled.  The 
establishment of a port JTTF is the FBI’s attempt to foster a collaborative relationship 
among the law enforcement sector. It is a step in the right direction, but without the 
private sector, the picture is incomplete. 
The private sector, particularly in the port environment, is essential in the 
facilitation of security throughout the complex.  These organizations own and operate the 
majority of both water and landside operations conducted in the complex.  Industries 
within the maritime arena are directly and significantly affected by the smallest of speed 
bumps occurring in that supply chain, let alone a major threat or worse, an attack. The 
delicate nature of the link between real or perceived dangers in the port by private sector 
stakeholders is both an economic and homeland security issue.  
Including the private sector is not only mandatory, but it is imperative to the 
creation of a well-planned strategy and thorough security plan. Several programs have 
seen the value and capitalized on the expertise offered by private industries.  FBI’s 
Infragard74 has been reaching out to companies through quarterly training and has a 
mechanism for disseminating information to them via email.  The Coast Guard recently 
implemented Homeport75 to reach out to civilian maritime partners.  Although these 
initiatives provide positive examples of public/private programs, they do not fill the gap 
required to effectively implement port security. Much more must be done.   Additional  
 
                                                 
74 Federal Bureau of Investigation, www.infragard.org  
75 United States Coast Guard, www.Homeport.uscg.mil [Accessed March 10, 2007]. 
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measures must meet the security needs and economic concerns of the private sector. They 
must follow a strategy that can be replicated in a manner that avoids further stovepipes of 
information or collaboration. 
A vigorous public/private collaborative program requires architecture, including a 
cyber backbone, where information sharing paves the way for developing plans and 
protocols to support the four pillars76 of the National Preparedness Goal (HSPD-8).  This 
architecture’s design allows port security participants to stop operating in a multitude of 
silos, ad hoc, without a single coordinating body.  Furthermore, this design enables a 
framework to link all port stakeholders, to develop standard operating procedures and to 
present a common operating picture. Perhaps most importantly, the collaborative efforts 
described here meet not only the security and economic concerns of the stakeholders 
involved, but the cycles of preparedness continue and extend through the use of networks 
that appropriately address the asymmetrical nature of the threat. 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security and the eight supporting plans77 
clearly call for and outline the need for extensive private sector involvement.  Several 
entities are taking the steps to reach out into the community for involvement.  Not linking 
these programs together though a network creates more modal stovepipes and further 
exacerbates this already complex venue. 
 
C. THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The Stevens Institute conducted an analysis of the application of Network Centric 
Operations in the Port of New York/New Jersey78. They also recommended a national or 
regional architecture to facilitate constant collaboration among all stakeholders. 
By applying the principles of networking theory in the maritime environment, two 
clear issues surface.  First, to effectively create overall maritime domain awareness, a 
framework for public/private collaboration must be designed and implemented.  Once the 
                                                 
76 The pillars are; prevention, protection, response and recovery. 
77 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington D.C. September, 2005). 
78 Securing the Port of New York and New Jersey: Network-Centric Operations Applied to the 
Campaign Against Terrorism.  
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framework or architecture is in place, information flow through a well-networked force 
greatly enhances situational awareness and portrays a larger common operating picture.  
It subsequently fulfills the requirement of the National Preparedness Goal as directed by 
the President. Applying effective operational structures to national strategic security 
goals is an important benefit of following the course of action described in this thesis. 
Second, and vastly more revealing, is the realization that when the theory is 
applied to the individual vulnerabilities, i.e. volume, intermodality, jurisdictional issues, 
quantity of stakeholders, global nature, time sensitivity and public/private interests79, the 
vulnerabilities are transformed  and leveraged as strengths within the supply chain. 
After the vulnerabilities and complexities in port security are examined and a 
theory identified and applied to the issue, perpetuation of the Cycle of Preparedness 
achieves the end result. The Cycle of Preparedness is relevant because it implements 
HSPD-8 and fulfills the national direction and mandate of sharing information at 
“unprecedented levels.”  It is time to set theory aside and implement this notional 
solution at the operational level. 
 
D. OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS 
The Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Applications of NCW 
The applications outlined in the tenets and principles of NCW lay a theoretical 
framework and identify the areas benefited by proper placement of information. This 
foundation, when coupled with a cyber backbone, allows for a true public/private 
collaborative program. 
Local law enforcement operating within the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port 
Complex are working in conjunction with private industry stakeholders to implement a 
public/private virtual maritime fusion center. The tenets and principles of NCW can be 
applied to increase overall port security.  This program is based on the author’s idea that 
disparate port related programs need to be linked for maximum effectiveness.  This idea 
is subsequently validated by the research and findings in this thesis. 
                                                 
79 Havemen, Shatz, and Vilchis, “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost.”   
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The maritime fusion center utilizes a web-based virtual computer program that 
uses Microsoft Groove® software and features many collaborative tools such as 
discussion boards, stored picture capabilities, sketchpad options, live chat (two-way 
communication), e-mail and joint calendar tools. The fact that the software system being 
employed is built on architecture readily available to both government and the private 
sector is essential. In the event of a live situation, the programs can create ad hoc 
workspaces for operational planning and resources allocation coordination.  This 
flexibility facilitates continued personal engagement, since those contacts take place 
within a structure that draws stakeholders in rather than excluding those that need the 
information most. 
The maritime fusion center initially includes members of the Los Angeles and 
Long Beach Police Departments, and private industry heads responsible for aspects of 
maritime security from prevention through the stages to recovery.  The program’s 
ultimate goal networks the disparate entities (public and private) to facilitate a flow of 
information capable of supporting port-wide situational awareness and a common 
operating picture to enhance security and protect the nation’s economic supply chain.   
An interagency group has been appointed. They are responsible for writing a 
strategy outlining the goals and needs of the program, and guidelines and standard 
operating procedures ensuring a collaborative environment.  This group is also 
responsible for setting goals and metrics to evaluate the program for utility and 
functionality, as well as vetting individuals granted access to the program to ensure its 
integrity.   The inquiry is also confirming that consumers “know what they need to know” 
and producers understand exactly what intelligence and resources the consumers need to 
secure their infrastructure. 
The working group in charge of designing the workspace realizes the uniqueness 
of the port environment and tailored the portal for the specific needs of its users.  The 
functionality and utility of the network “office” requires the inclusion of the following 
areas or “rooms:” 
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Discussion Room—This area includes transparent discussions among law 
enforcement and private stakeholders on topics such as current threats, precautionary 
measures, area incidents, legislative or regulatory updates and any other related 
information. 
Situational Awareness Room—Real time threats, law enforcement actions 
and/or current, live incidents that affect port operations80are posted in this area.  This 
allows for facility security officers to self-synchronize by either evacuating their facility, 
enacting business continuity plans or remaining status quo if applicable.  At a basic level, 
it gives the private sector the necessary information in a timely manner to properly secure 
his/her facility. 
Reports and Guidelines Room—This area enables both law enforcement and 
private stakeholders to post current guidelines, standard operating procedures, regional 
requirements and even newly mandated programs.  Again, this process allows for 
transparency throughout the port complex, alleviating silos and the lack of common 
procedures and polices. 
Intelligence Bulletins Room—Unclassified intelligence bulletins are listed in this 
section from federal, open, military or private sector sources.  This area’s goal provides a 
single location to review intelligence applicable to the maritime and/or critical 
infrastructure sectors, preventing information overload. 
Web-links Room—Several useful public/private online collaborations have been 
created and implemented such as Infragard and Homeport that issue useful and unique 
information.  Through hyperlinks, users can access these programs from one central 
location.  Other useful links are listed such as The Department of Homeland Security, 
Business Executives for National Security and the homepages of the United States Coast 
Guard, Los Angeles Police Department, Long Beach Police Department and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations.  Board members can approve adding websites upon per request. 
Calendar Room—The calendar section organizes meetings, conferences and 
training events as they apply to MDA.  Scheduling conflicts frequently arise among port 
                                                 
80 This applies to operational information at the unclassified level. 
 51
entities hosting important, useful training and exercises.  The calendar enables 
coordination among the port players so that primary information is not lost due to 
scheduling issues. 
This thesis provides the intellectual and analytical framework for the operational 
design of a robust public/private collaborative network in a maritime environment.  
Additionally, this thesis outlines a program in the implementation phase which employs 
NCW theory and framework to bridge the collaborative gap currently seen in the region.  
The successful implementation of this program enables many of the components outlined 
in the National Strategy for Maritime Security and greatly enhances MDA by including 
the private sector.  When it is operating at its fullest capacity and potential, the virtual 
maritime fusion center expects to apply the principles of network centric operations to 
perpetuate the Cycle of Preparedness and become a regional model for other ports to 
follow. 
 
E. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The ultimate goal of a fully robust networked architecture includes sensor data 
such as surveillance and tracking capabilities.  With the expansion of technology, each 
port across the country can replicate this regional network.  Once the respective ports 
establish the primary networks, each port network could link together to form a larger 
“network of networks.”  This string of networks supports the potential of creating global 
connectivity, a goal that extends both national and global security. The mini-networks 
linking international companies with the public sector all over the world facilitates this 
connectivity, creating a flow of information both vertically and horizontally and 
enhancing global maritime domain awareness.   
The current LA/LB collaborative program uses technology which is reliable, 
secure, affordable and robust enough for the initial regional implementation.  However, 
to achieve an overarching port intelligence network complete with sensor capabilities and 




The breadth and depth of research needed to acquire the appropriate information 
technology software robust enough to fulfill the larger networking program requirements 
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APPENDIX 




    
    
    
    
    
1. More collaborative interaction between public/private stakeholders is needed to improve prevention, 
protection, response and recovery efforts. 
Strongly Disagree   0 0% 
Disagree   3 6% 
Agree   18 36% 
Strongly Agree   29 58% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
2. A networked system including intelligence dissemination, clear reporting procedures and situational updates 
would be useful in securing critical infrastructure. 
Strongly Disagree   0 0% 
Disagree   2 4% 
Agree   10 20% 
Strongly Agree   38 76% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
3. How often does your company participate in a collaborative meetings, training sessions or port exercises? 
Never   2 4% 
Seldom (Monthly)   32 64% 
Frequently (Weekly)   15 30% 
Very Frequently (Daily)   1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
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4. Do you currently participate in any networked system enhancing collaboration in the Port? 
No   24 48% 
Yes   26 52% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
5. Are you a member of any component of the Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC)? 
No   20 40% 
Yes   30 60% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
6. Rate your level of SATISFACTION with the communication between the public and private stakeholders in the 
port. 
Very Dissatisfied   4 8% 
Dissatisfied   24 49% 
Satisfied   21 43% 
Very Satisfied   0 0% 
Total 49 100% 
    
    
7. How useful would real time situational awareness be for your daily operations? 
Not Useful   1 2% 
Useful   9 18% 
Very Useful   39 78% 
Unknown   1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
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8. How often do you receive close to real time (within 10 minutes) situational updates during an incident 
occurring in the port? 
Never   8 16% 
Seldom (Monthly)   27 54% 
Frequently (Weekly)   11 22% 
Very Frequently (Daily)   4 8% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
9. How would you rate your level of satisfaction with the amount of intelligence information you receive? 
Very dissatisfied   3 6% 
Dissatisfied   26 52% 
Satisfied   20 40% 
Very satisfied   1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
10. The intelligence bulletins I receive contain actionable information. 
Strongly Disagree   3 6% 
Disagree   24 48% 
Agree   23 46% 
Strongly Agree   0 0% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
11. How often do you receive intelligence briefs? 
Never   6 12% 
Seldom (Monthly)   18 36% 
Frequently (Weekly)   15 30% 
Very Frequently (Daily)   11 22% 
Total 50 100% 
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12. Approximate the percent of all intelligence bulletins you currently receive from each source. 
Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total respondents selecting the 
option. 
0% 25% 50% 
18 12 10 
Municipal Agencies __% 
44% 29% 24% 
19 14 5 
County Agencies __% 
48% 35% 12% 
19 16 0 
State Agencies __% 
50% 42% 0% 
7 19 11 
Federal Agencies __% 
15% 40% 23% 
28 9 1 
Private Agencies __% 
74% 24% 3% 
9 17 9 
Joint Agencies or Task Forces ___% 
20% 38% 20% 
19 5 2 
Other, ____% 
70% 19% 7% 
    
    
13. My agency or organization has clear procedures/guidelines for reporting suspicious activity. 
Strongly Disagree   1 2% 
Disagree   2 4% 
Agree   21 42% 
Strongly Agree   26 52% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
14. Clear, standard operating procedures have been established between public/private stakeholders. 
Strongly Disagree   6 12% 
Disagree   25 50% 
Agree   18 36% 
Strongly Agree   1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
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15. What form of communication would be most effective for your organization to receive situational updates? 
Phone   29 58% 
Fax   7 14% 
Pager   2 4% 
Email   40 80% 
Online Website   10 20% 
Other, please specify   5 10% 
    
    
16. Approximate the percent of all terrorism awareness training you currently receive from each source 
Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total respondents selecting the 
option. 
0% 25% 50% 
18 15 3 
Municipal __% 
46% 38% 8% 
21 11 1 
County __% 
57% 30% 3% 
19 11 4 
State __% 
48% 28% 10% 
6 16 12 
Federal __% 
12% 33% 25% 
19 11 6 
Private __% 
46% 27% 15% 
20 5 0 
Other__% 
69% 17% 0% 
    
    
17. How do you rate your SATISFACTION with the level of terrorism training you receive to secure critical 
infrastructure? 
Very Dissatisfied   4 8% 
Dissatisfied   28 56% 
Satisfied   18 36% 
Very Satisfied   0 0% 
Total 50 100% 
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18. More terrorism/disaster preparedness training would benefit my organization. 
Strongly Disagree   0 0% 
Disagree   2 4% 
Agree   20 40% 
Strongly Agree   28 56% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
19. My employment is primarily with an agency or organization at the following tier: 
Municipal   17 34% 
County   1 2% 
State   0 0% 
Federal   6 12% 
Private   25 50% 
Other, please specify   1 2% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
20. My current discipline is best described as: 
Law Enforcement/Government   24 48% 
Private Security/Facility Security Officer   21 42% 
Other, please specify   5 10% 
Total 50 100% 
    
    
21. Please add any additional comments or feedback. 
22 Responses 
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